The recent resurgence of violence by extremist groups such as Boko Haram, Islamic State West Africa Province, ISWAP, bandits and others, has once again placed Nigeria at the centre of Africa’s security concerns.

A string of deadly bombings, raids on military bases, and attacks on civilian communities, particularly in the North-East, North-Central and North-West, signals not just a continuation of a long-running insurgency, but a dangerous new phase.

For many Nigerians, especially in conflict-affected states, the situation is a grim reminder that despite years of military campaigns and official claims of progress, the threat remains deeply entrenched.

Sunday Vanguard observed that what is unfolding is not merely a revival of old tactics, but an evolution of the insurgency itself.

The attacks have also become more diffuse, spilling beyond traditional strongholds and intersecting with other forms of insecurity across the country.

This has raised urgent questions about the effectiveness of current strategies and whether Nigeria’s security architecture is adequately equipped to confront a threat that is adapting faster than anticipated.

As the nation grapples with the implications, debates are intensifying over the best path forward.

Should Nigeria double down on military force, or pivot towards intelligence-driven and community-based approaches? What role should regional cooperation and international partners play, particularly countries like the United States, which have previously provided limited support?

The answers to these posers were provided by security experts in several conversations with Sunday Vanguard.

Specifically, they examined the drivers of the renewed violence and explored what must change if Nigeria is to regain the upper hand in the fight against widespread insecurity.

Biggest weakness

Speaking on the matter, Managing Director of Systems Securities, Dr Akinwale Tijani, argued that Nigeria’s biggest weakness in the fight against insecurity is not a lack of force, but a lack of coherence and foresight.

According to him, security operations remain largely reactive, fragmented across agencies, and poorly coordinated, allowing insurgent groups to exploit gaps between the military, police, and intelligence services.

He noted that government has also failed to sustain control over reclaimed territories, often declaring victories prematurely while neglecting stabilization, governance, and civilian protection.

This, he added, creates a cycle where terrorists regroup, rearm, and return to the same vulnerable communities.

His words: “Nigeria must shift toward a proactive, intelligence-driven strategy anchored in strong local engagement and institutional reform. This includes investing heavily in human intelligence networks, improving inter-agency data sharing, and deploying modern surveillance technologies consistently rather than sporadically.

“Beyond the battlefield, Nigeria must confront the structural drivers of insecurity like youth unemployment, weak local governance, and deep community distrust while simultaneously reforming and properly equipping its security forces. Success will depend on combining sustained military pressure with long-term state-building efforts, ensuring that once territories are cleared, they are effectively governed and protected from reinfiltration.”

Terror financiers

On his part, a professor of International Relations at Lagos State University, Dapo Thomas, said Nigeria’s worsening insecurity can only be addressed by targeting and dismantling the financial networks sustaining insurgency and banditry.

Thomas told Sunday Vanguard that focusing solely on military operations without addressing the sources of funding for terrorist groups will yield limited results.

According to him, as long as financiers and sponsors of violent groups remain untouched, insurgents will continue to adapt, relocate and sustain their operations across different parts of the country.

“The key to ending insecurity lies in dismantling those financing these activities. If they are still being funded and protected, the violence will persist,” he said.

The university don further alleged that some individuals within political and government circles are complicit in sustaining insecurity, describing Nigeria’s insurgency as largely politically motivated.

He expressed concern that despite intelligence reports reportedly identifying sponsors of groups such as Boko Haram, successive administrations have failed to prosecute those involved, thereby allowing the crisis to fester.

Thomas also linked the persistence of insecurity to political developments, noting that rising tensions ahead of elections often contribute to instability and violence.

While acknowledging efforts by the government to equip the military with modern weapons and ammunition, he said there has been little visible improvement in security outcomes, urging stronger institutional commitment and accountability.

On foreign collaboration, he cautioned against expanding external involvement beyond current intelligence-sharing arrangements, insisting that the priority should be internal reforms and decisive action against those funding terrorism. He warned that until the financiers of insurgency are identified, arrested and prosecuted, Nigeria may continue to witness recurring waves of violence and insecurity across the country.

Intelligence coordination

Lending his voice, founder of Arewa Security Network, Alhaji Mounde Tafida, argued that the recent surge in Boko Haram attacks reflects serious lapses in sustained military pressure and intelligence coordination.

He noted that insurgents are exploiting gaps created by the redeployment of troops to other internal security crises, as well as weak border controls that allow fighters and weapons to flow in from the wider Sahel region.

According to him, “the inconsistent presence of security forces in previously liberated areas has enabled terrorist groups to regroup, recruit, and launch increasingly bold attacks on both civilians and military targets.

“Nigeria must urgently rebuild momentum through continuous operations, stronger intelligence-sharing, and tighter border security, while also restoring confidence among affected communities.

“Local vigilante networks and community informants should be better integrated into formal security structures to improve early warning systems and disrupt attacks before they occur.

“Given the evolving sophistication of these groups, Nigeria cannot afford to fight this battle in isolation. There is a clear need for enhanced international collaboration, particularly from the United States, in the areas of intelligence, surveillance, training, and logistics support. Strengthening this partnership will significantly improve Nigeria’s capacity to degrade terrorist networks and prevent further escalation of attacks.”

Emergency

On his part, Managing Director, Badinson Security, Matthew Ibadin, in a chat with Sunday Vanguard, argued: “What is responsible is the foundation, which has been rotting over the years. It is not about renewed attacks, there have been attacks over the years. After the Shehu Shagari regime, no democratically elected government or head of state has been able to inject funds into the police. Today, there are many countries in the world that can do without the army, but there is no country without police. This is where the problem lies. Today, what we need in Nigeria is to have what we call an emergency intervention fund for the police. We need about three trillion Naira.

“In South Africa, their police have 57 helicopters, in Nigeria, our police have less than three functional helicopters. South Africa has about 70 million people, we are almost 240 million. Can you see the disparity? You also find out that the problem we face today is the lack of a crime database. This is the only country where when you commit a crime, you are treated as a first offender.

“There is no data to show that a person had committed crime in the past. Looking at this, there is no way we won’t be having the current crime from the same people who have been committing it. We must invest in the problem. Without a functional police, we cannot solve the problem of insecurity. The Army cannot do it alone because we have a lot of ungoverned spaces in Nigeria. This is where the problem lies. The United States cannot fight your battles for you.

Budget

“As of today, the US has a lot of problems. If we are waiting for the US to come and solve our problems for us, we are wasting our time. How many soldiers recently came from the US? Is that what we need to solve insecurity in Nigeria? How many states will they go to? The earlier we sit down as a nation to formulate a 21st century insecurity architecture, the better it is for us.

“We don’t have the infrastructure to fight crime, and the US won’t give us that. No government has given the police its 100 per cent budget. It is 30 to 40 per cent at most. What we need now isn’t a budget, it is intervention. I am an advocate of state police, but that cannot be done without fixing national police. It will be counterproductive. There will be complications in the country. Even as an advocate of state police and even local government police, I urge federal government to first fix the national police.”

For the Managing Director of Debreeze Protection Services Ltd, Mr Dickson Osajie, he told Sunday Vanguard that the renewed attacks are the result of a combination of factors such as ntelligence gaps, pressure on overstretched security forces, porous borders, the ability of terror groups to regroup in rural enclaves and the evolving tactics of non-state actors such as Boko Haram and ISWAP.

Osajie said: “The recent attacks in Borno, including the March 16, 2026, bombings in Maiduguri and the March 18 assault on a military base in Mallam Fatori, show that these groups remain resilient, adaptive, and capable of using both suicide bombers and emerging tools such as armed drones. For me, the current wave reflects growing operational confidence among the insurgents rather than their total defeat.

“Government must move beyond a purely reactive military approach and adopt a comprehensive national security response. First, intelligence collection and intelligence-sharing between the military, DSS, police, civil defence, and local vigilante structures must be strengthened. Second, border security and surveillance technology must be improved, especially in the North-East and along transnational routes used by fighters and weapons traffickers. Third, troops on the front lines need better welfare, equipment, air support, and rapid reinforcement capacity. Fourth, government must cut off the recruitment pipeline by addressing poverty, unemployment, ideological radicalisation, and weak governance in vulnerable communities. Finally, there must be sustained stabilisation of recovered communities through policing, local intelligence networks, and visible state presence, because insurgents often exploit ungoverned spaces after military clearances. We must stop the character of conquered and abandoned.

“The United States can support Nigeria, but it should not become the primary face of the counterinsurgency. U.S. assistance is most useful in the areas of intelligence, surveillance, logistics, specialised training, and precision support to help Nigeria build lasting domestic capacity. Direct foreign intervention may produce temporary tactical gains, but it cannot substitute for a strong Nigerian-led strategy rooted in local intelligence, legitimate governance, and coordinated security operations. So yes, the U.S. can do more, but mainly in targeted support roles that strengthen Nigeria’s own counterterrorism architecture rather than replace it.” (Sunday Vanguard)