. Says politicians played politics with insecurity, only to pay the price later

Nigeria’s former Chief of Defence Staff, General Lucky Irabor (rtd), has opened up on the complex interplay between politics and national security, revealing how political interference, lack of coordination and failure to formally declare war against insurgents have prolonged the fight against Boko Haram.

He spoke on these and other issues as monitored on a national television by Daily Sun.

Part of the documentation in your book reflects on where you were when the Chibok abduction happened in April 2014. Could you share your recollection of that period?

At that time, I was a Brigadier General serving in 3 Division. The division’s area of responsibility covered Bauchi and parts of the North-East. Chibok, however, fell outside our direct operational control. The General Officer Commanding (GOC), 3 Division, then, Major General M.Y. Ibrahim, was tasked to visit Chibok following the abduction incident. I was in Yola when the incident occurred on the night of April 14-15, 2014. Two days later, I proceeded to Chibok to see firsthand what had transpired. A good number of our findings from that visit were documented in my book. It was indeed a terrible and emotional experience for me personally, but it also helped in strengthening my understanding of the complexities surrounding that tragedy. The experience deepened my awareness and preparedness for future operational challenges, including my later role as Theatre Commander of Operation Lafiya Dole. So, to be clear, when the abduction happened, I was in Yola. Two days later, I visited Chibok to assess the situation myself.

You spent over two years as the Chief of Defence Staff, quite an interesting period in your career. What would you say was the most troubling or challenging period for you as the nation’s number one military officer?

Every period came with its own challenges, but I would say the most troubling was when incidents such as mass abductions occurred. Those moments tested our resolve and strategic capacity the most. The Chibok abduction, in particular, added a new dimension to the challenges we were facing at the time. It compelled us to deploy every ounce of experience we had to ensure the safe rescue of those abducted and to prevent further occurrences. Beyond that, the operations in the North East weighed heavily on my mind. I had spent a significant part of my career there as a Major General, so it was personally important to see sustained progress in that theatre. We worked hard to ensure that the gains made were not reversed and that operations were better coordinated. Another key area of focus for me as Chief of Defence Staff was the Niger Delta. We had to engage several stakeholders to improve oil production, which was, and still is, a major source of national revenue. Stabilising that region was essential to improving the country’s financial inflows.

So, in summary, the three most challenging aspects for me were managing incidents of abduction and insecurity in the North -East, sustaining military gains and operational effectiveness across the country, and engaging stakeholders in the Niger -Delta to enhance oil production and economic stability. These were the critical issues that defined my time as Chief of Defence Staff.

Let’s talk about the role of politics and its impact on military operations in Nigeria. Some observers say political interference has, at times, affected the efficiency of the armed forces. How true is that?

That’s a very important question. First, every human being is, by nature, a political animal. Soldiers are men and women drawn from society, but they belong to a professional institution that serves as an instrument of state policy. Now, because the military operates under political authority, people often assume that political decisions automatically influence or interfere with military operations. That assumption isn’t entirely correct. There’s a clear distinction between political policy decisions and partisan politics. Soldiers have never been, and should never be, deployed for partisan political purposes. However, the military often acts in response to political policy decisions particularly when insecurity arises. Every violent conflict is, in one way or another, linked to politics, because politics itself is about managing conflict.

As one author rightly said, “Politics is managed conflict.” When the management of conflict fails, it leads to violence and that’s when the military is called in. So, in essence, when the armed forces are deployed, they are helping to implement political policy decisions intended to restore order and stability, not to serve partisan interests.

One of the reasons I ask this question is because many analysts argue that the early hours after an abduction are the most critical. In the case of the Chibok abduction, the response seemed delayed, and there was even an initial sense of denial from the political leadership almost as if it never happened. How devastating was that, and what role did politics play in that scenario?

At the time, I was a tactical commander, so I had a clear understanding of the dynamics at play. Unfortunately, politics in Nigeria tends to be highly toxic, and that toxicity often spills over into national security matters. One of the key points I made in my book is that we must begin to reform how we engage in politics in this country. Politics should be people-centered, focused on improving the lives of citizens rather than being driven by personal or partisan gain. At that time, there was already heightened political tension leading up to the 2015 general elections. Many discussions and decisions were influenced by electoral considerations. It became apparent that some of the responses to the Chibok incident were coloured by the political contest between the federal government and the Borno State government.

This political friction affected coordination, trust, and the urgency with which the matter was initially handled. It was deeply unfortunate because national security should always transcend politics. Our collective focus should have been on the safety of the girls and the integrity of the nation, not on who gained or lost political ground.

At the time of the Chibok abduction, there seemed to be a lot of political undertones surrounding the incident. From your perspective on the ground, what really happened?

Yes, there was a lot happening in the air. A lot of political noise, accusations, and counter-accusations. But for me, as someone who was physically on the ground, the reality was clear: there had been an abduction. I was there two days after it happened and saw the devastation firsthand.

However, I think the more important question is not whether the abduction happened, but why there was no coordinated capacity among responders to act quickly. That gap in response capacity remains one of the key lessons. This is part of why I felt compelled to document these experiences. Political decisions have far-reaching implications for the government agencies responsible for implementing security policies. When those decisions are not well-coordinated or timely, it affects the aggregate effectiveness of all institutions involved and that’s what manifests as either security or insecurity in the country.

In your assessment and from your documentation, why has Boko Haram persisted for this long?

That’s a profound question. In my view, Boko Haram represents a critical juncture in Nigeria’s developmental journey. A symptom, not the root, of our national security challenges. The underlying issues that Boko Haram exploited predate our independence. Historically, Nigeria has been plagued by political divisions and disunity among leaders, even before independence and immediately afterward. I traced some of these tensions back to events such as the crisis involving Chief Obafemi Awolowo in 1962, which led to his imprisonment in 1963, and the subsequent political instability that culminated in the first military coup.

These historical fractures created deep-seated mistrust among political actors and regions. Fast forward to today, and you will see that many of those patterns remain. So, when Boko Haram emerged in the early 2000s, it simply took advantage of that persistent disorder, the lack of cohesion, the competition for political advantage, and the failure to address systemic inequality and poor governance. The insurgents exploited these weaknesses, using prevailing political narratives to gain sympathy, space, and leverage. That, to me, remains one of our greatest national challenges and a major reason I wrote about it.

We must begin to pursue a psychological reorientation of our people to change how we manage conflict and perceive politics. Beyond that, there is an urgent need for national reconciliation. We must heal from our historical divisions and embark on wide-ranging reforms: security sector reform, political reorientation, restructuring where necessary, and above all, good governance.

Policing, in particular, must be strengthened. Without an effective policing infrastructure, every other effort by the military will only provide temporary relief. Ultimately, when all these elements – governance, security reform, reconciliation, and effective policing are synchronised, we can achieve a stable and secure nation.

So yes, politics is central to our security reality. Politics has, in many ways, contributed to the destruction of our security architecture. But it is also through politics the right kind of politics that we can rebuild and fix it.

In your book, you reflected on how these experiences affected you personally, morally and emotionally especially in moments when you had to make tough decisions. You also served as Chief of Defence Staff for over two years and a few days. But some people argue that under your leadership, the war against terror reached a plateau rather than achieving a breakthrough. How do you respond to that?

Well, in every effort, there will always be two sides – those who view it positively and those who see it differently. For me, I believe we recorded significant breakthroughs during my tenure. At the strategic level, one of my greatest achievements was fostering unity of purpose among the armed forces and other security agencies. Building that synergy, getting everyone to think, plan, and act in unity toward a common objective remains, for me, one of the most heartwarming outcomes of my time as Chief of Defence Staff.

Of course, people are free to hold their opinions. Some may say we reached a plateau, but I would say that unless one is deeply involved in the processes and constraints we faced, it’s difficult to fully appreciate the impact that was made.

If you had the opportunity to do things differently, what would you have changed?

Honestly, I don’t think there’s anything I would have done entirely differently. Rather, I would seek to optimise some of the actions I took to make them even more effective. I was quite firm in engaging with the political leadership, consistently drawing their attention to critical issues that needed to be confronted head-on. My approach was always professional and focused. I made it clear that certain actions and commitments were necessary to sustain the momentum of our operations.

Did politicians ever try to influence or derail your work?

I wouldn’t say they tried to derail me, but there were certainly limitations like structural and systemic that affected how decisions were made. From my understanding of political economy, I recognise that political leaders often operate under competing pressures.

However, I was always candid in communicating with them. I made sure they understood the realities on the ground, the need for more resources, better training, and stronger inter-agency collaboration. My duty was to present the facts clearly and professionally, and I did that consistently.

There’s a public perception that some individuals might be benefiting financially from the insecurity in Nigeria. How true is that?

On the part of the military, that is absolutely not true. But it’s important to understand that in any war situation, what we often refer to as a war economy tends to emerge. This isn’t unique to Nigeria; it happens in every conflict environment.

During war, the cost of living inevitably rises. The prices of goods, services, and logistics especially (SUN)