Minister of Foreign Affairs, Yusuf Maitama Tuggar, was stating the obvious when he raised concerns recently, over the withdrawal of Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), stating that the decision will have significant security and economic repercussions. Indeed, the repercussions are already manifesting in many areas. The regional body surely must think beyond the box for it to survive.

Following the sanctions by ECOWAS on Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso in January 2024 due to the military coups that ousted their respective elected governments, the military leaders of the three countries exited ECOWAS and formed a new bloc ? the Alliance of Sahel States (AES). Despite several efforts by ECOWAS leaders to reintegrate the three countries, they have vowed not to return, arguing that leaving ECOWAS serves the best interests of their populations and accusing ECOWAS of imposing ?inhumane and irresponsible? coup-related sanctions while failing to address their internal security crises. January 29, 2025 marked the final exit of AES members from ECOWAS.

The logical questions confronting ECOWAS are: What become of ECOWAS as AES members exit the regional bloc? Can the AES members change their minds and return to ECOWAS? What efforts are Nigeria and the rest of Africa making to persuade AES to return to ECOWAS? How does ECOWAS survive and remain relevant as the three states snub treatise to make them return?

To begin with, countries in West Africa are stronger when together: Being divided as they are weakens their regional military and economic cooperation, and reduces the region?s capacity to address critical challenges such as electricity shortages and environmental degradation; even aggravating humanitarian situation in AES countries.

In the ?spirit of regional solidarity,? ECOWAS has asked its member countries to continue recognising the national passports of the AES countries bearing the ECOWAS logo until further notice. ECOWAS has also agreed to continue treating goods and services coming from the three AES countries according to the ECOWAS Trade Liberalization Scheme (ETLS) and investment policy. Additionally, ECOWAS will allow citizens of the three affected AES countries to continue enjoying visa-free movement, residence, and establishment in accordance with the ECOWAS protocols until further notice.

This sounds promising. However, in practice, pulling out of ECOWAS exacerbates the lingering internal animosity, rancor, and hostility among the leaders and citizens of AES and ECOWAS countries. It also hampers free trade and free movement. For instance, Benin and Niger have been in a dispute since ECOWAS lifted sanctions on Niger. Niger has refused to open its borders with Benin in retaliation for supporting the closed borders, thereby depriving Benin of transit revenue. More importantly, intelligence and information-sharing between the AES countries and ECOWAS member states to combat transnational organized crimes has weakened due to suspicions and the potential collapse of existing regional frameworks of collaboration.

More critically, the economic implications of the AES members? withdrawal from ECOWAS are staggering. The estranged AES members, having exited the regional economic community, have limited access to markets, thus hindering economic growth. Their withdrawal, according to Tuggar, may disrupt regional integration efforts, including the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA); and this are already manifesting.

Moreover, since ECOWAS states account for more than 50% of Malian imports, 21% of imports from Burkina Faso, and 13% of imports from Niger, a definite increase in prices in their domestic markets will put additional socio-economic pressure on their already struggling economies.

As members of ECOWAS, the exiting AES states are part of the multi-purpose ECOWAS Standby Forces (ESF), composed of military, police, and civilian staff from member states, which are activated to restore peace and stability amid military coups and other challenges to national or regional security. However, withdrawing from ECOWAS implies exiting collective security frameworks like the ESF as well.

The Sahel Region, which includes Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso, is the epicenter of terrorist activities and the humanitarian crisis. In fact, the 2024 Global Terrorism Index report indicated that the epicenter of terrorism has shifted from the Middle East to the Central Sahel region, which now accounts for over half of all deaths from terrorism. Burkina Faso is reported to have suffered the worst impact from terrorism globally, with deaths increasing by 68% despite attacks decreasing by 17%. With the exit of the AES countries, all these statistics point to a deteriorating security situation in the region which could have reduced through collective regional action and cooperation.

Despite parting ways, ECOWAS and AES countries should find ways to cooperate within alternative frameworks or arrangements to maintain beneficial regional ties, even if full membership is no longer possible. This requires a blend of diplomacy, reform, economic incentives, and tailored security strategies. By focusing on inclusivity, mutual benefit, and respect for the unique challenges of AES countries, ECOWAS could help resolve tensions and possibly bring these countries back into the fold.

Since ECOWAS is an important part of the African Union?s (AU) broader vision of continental integration, the AU could play a mediating role in resolving tensions. The AU could help broker a solution that ensures the AES countries are included in the broader African framework, even if they are no longer part of ECOWAS. (The Guardian Editorial)

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